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Author (up) Johnson-Laird, P.N.; Byrne, R.M.J.; Schaeken, W. file  url
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  Title Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang Type Journal Article
  Year 1994 Publication Psychological Review Abbreviated Journal Psychological Review  
  Volume 101 Issue 4 Pages 734-739  
  Keywords Propositional reasoning; Mental model theory  
  Abstract D. P. O'Brien et al (see record 1995-08272-001) argue that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning is easy to refute, and they report 3 experiments that they believe falsify the theory. In contrast, L. Bonatti (see record 1995-08253-001) argues that the model theory is too flexible to be falsified. It is shown that the experiments by O'Brien et al do not refute the model theory and that Bonatti's claims are ill founded. Formal rule theories of propositional reasoning have 3 major weaknesses in comparison with the model theory: (1) They have no decision procedure; (2) they lack predictive power, providing no account of several robust phenomena (e.g., erroneous conclusions tend to be consistent with the premises); and (3) as a class of theories, they are difficult to refute experimentally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)  
  Call Number Serial 1981  
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